A blind signature scheme is a cryptographic protocol to obtain a valid signature for a message from a signer such that signer's view of the protocol can't be linked to the resulting message signature pair. This paper presents blind signature scheme using Chebyshev polynomials. The security of the given scheme depends upon the intractability of the integer factorization problem and discrete logarithms of Chebyshev polynomials.
Untraceability: the signer of the blind signature is unable to link the message-signature pair even when the signature has been revealed to the public.
There are many blind signature schemes have been proposed. Recently, many researchers proposed a variety of blind signature schemes [19, 20, 21] . The most widely used blind signature schemes are: RSA blind signature schemes [2] , ElGamal signature scheme [5] , and Schnorr Blind signature scheme [6] . RSA blind signature scheme security is based on the problem of integer factorization, while ElGamal and Schnorr blind signature schemes are based on the problem of discrete logarithm.
As Chebyshev polynomials have semi-group property in real field, a public key cryptosystem was proposed [11] , on the assumption that the computation of Chebyshev polynomial in real field is a one-way function. But it was soon found the private key could be quickly recovered from the public key, using trigonometric function substitution [14, 16] . In other words, the oneway condition is not satisfied in such cryptosystem. To resist this attack, some references recommended [24, 27] .
In this paper, we propose a blind signature scheme based on Chebyshev polynomials. Our scheme can meet the above requirements namely, correctness, blindness, unforgeability and untraceability. The security of the given scheme depends upon the intractability of the integer factorization problem and discrete logarithms of Chebyshev polynomials. The proposed scheme utilizes fewer numbers of bits due to inherent property of Chebysev polynomials as compared to its blind signature scheme such as RSA blind signature scheme.
The outline of this paper as follows: In section 2, the basic concept of Chebyshev polynomials and properties have been studied. In section3, the blind signature scheme has been proposed and also an example has been given. In section 4, the proposed scheme security issues have been discussed. Finally, section 4 describes concluding remarks.
CHEBYSHEV POLYNOMIALS
In this section we briefly describe Chebyshev polynomials, since they represent the cornerstone on which the public key cryptosystem, described in [11, 15] , key agreement protocols, described in [23] and the authentication scheme, described in [14] , are built.
Definition:
Let n be an integer, and let x be a variable taking value over the interval [-1, 1] . The polynomial ( ) : [ 1, 1] 
Some examples of Chebyshev polynomials are 
n m m n P P x P P x = with ( ) n P x a polynomial of degree n.
Binary powering for Chebyshev polynomials
We seek to generalize the binary powering algorithm, so that we can quickly computes values of the Chebyshev polynomial modulo p. We first rewrite the recurrence for Chebyshev 
The equation with n diminished by 1 becomes:
Combining the above equations yields
We continue to replace the vector on the right side until the index is 0, yielding
= , the vector on the right is just the transpose of the row vector ( ) 1, x . Hence we just compute the above using matrix binary powering, perform one matrix-vector product, and then extract the first element of the resulting vector to obtain ( ) n T x . Using the classical matrix-matrix multiplication algorithm, we can do one matrix multiplication with individual elements reduced modulo p using 8 integer multiplications, 4 integer additions, and 4 integer remainder operations. As the exponent n p < we use (log( )) O p matrix multiplications modulo p to compute the value of the degree n Chebyshev polynomial modulo p . This calculation has been resulted that the calculation would take about 4 to 8 times more C.P.U. time than the conventional Diffie-Hellman algorithm, depending on the cost of a large integer division relative to a large integer multiplication [12] .
Properties of Chebyshev polynomial sequences modulo a prime
To investigate the difficulty of inverting ( )(mod ) n a T x p = , with n unknown, we generate some experimental data. Choosing a small p, we can compute the sequence ( )(mod ) n T a p for n = 0, 1, 2, until we discover the period of the sequence. The result is that the period is at most p + 1 for any given input argument x = 0, 1, 2, ..., p − 1. For example , when x = 3, and p = 11, the sequence T n (3)(mod11) for n = 0,1,2,3…………23 is: Proof: In [12] , it has shown that one can compute ( )(mod ) = − + , performing one matrix-vector product modulo p, and then selecting the first element in the resulting vector. The determinant of this matrix is also equal to the co-efficient of 0 λ of ( ) f λ , which is 1; thus the matrix is non-singular. As the 0 th power of the matrix is the identity matrix, the period k is the smallest positive integer such that the k th power of the matrix is the identity matrix. We can compute powers of a matrix by finding its Jordan canonical form, computing powers of the Jordan canonical form, then transforming back. Recall that the Jordan canonical form is either a diagonal matrix with distinct eigenvalues on the diagonal, or an upper triangular matrix with repeated eigenvalues on the diagonal; these eigenvalues are also roots of the characteristic polynomial. In the case of the characteristic polynomial has repeated roots, they both must be mod p ± because the only least-residue solutions of 2 1 0(mod ) y p − = are 1 y = ± . In the case that 1 is a double root, x = 1and our sequence is 1, 1, 1, ------which has period 1. In the other case, the repeated root is -1 with x = -1; our sequence is 1, p -1, 1, p -1, -----which has period 2 and is a divisor of p -1 , as p is odd. We consider the that the distinct roots lie in GF(p) . From Fermat's theorem, 1 1(mod )
for any non-zero a p < . The (p -1) st power of the Jordan canonical form matrix is the identity matrix, so our sequence has period at most p -1. If a small exponent 1 k p < − exists such that k th power of our Jordan canonical form matrix is the identity, k must be a divisor of p -1, because, by Lagrange's theorem for the order of a subgroups of a finite group, the period must be a divisor of p -1. The other case is that the roots exists only in a Quadratic extension of GF(p). We can still diagonalize our matrix as long as we do our arithmetic in that quadratic extension field. First we raise our diagonal Jordan canonical form matrix to power p; such raising a number to the power p is an automorphism in the quadratic extension fields. Hence the two roots just swap position on the diagonal, as we have only one non-identity automorphism in a quadratic extension field. Then we multiply our original Jordan canonical -form matrix to complete the calculation of the (p + 1) st power .This just multiplies two pairs of conjugate roots. As the product of the conjugate roots is also coefficient of 0 λ in the characteristic polynomial, which is 1. The (p + 1) st power is the identity matrix. Thus the period is at most (p + 1). Again by Lagrange's theorem, the period must be a divisor of (p + 1). We recommend choosing p to be a safe prime, and check that (p+1) had large prime factor or that it is hard to factor.
The discrete log problem for Chebyshev polynomials
To make the protocol practical we require an efficient algorithm for computing ( )(mod ) n T x p for the n and p large. We call this as Chebyshev discrete log problem. We map the Chebyshev discrete log problem onto the conventional discrete log problem by recalling the hyperbolic definition of Chebyshev polynomials and solving it for n. We have the following theorem. in [7] .
3. BLIND SIGNATURE SCHEME
Blind signature Scheme by David Chaums
Recall the Chum's blind signature scheme [2] , based on RSA cryptographic algorithm. RSA based blind signature scheme is divided into five phases: initializing, blinding, signing, unblinding, and verifying. The signer first publishes the public information in the initializing phase. In the blinding phase, the requester blinds the message and sends it to the signer for requesting the signature. Then the signer signs the blinded message in the signing phase. In the unblinding phase, the requester derives the signature from the blinded signature. Finally, anyone can verify the legitimacy of signature in the verifying phase. The details of this scheme are described as follows:
Initializing phase:
The signer randomly chooses two large primes p and q, and computes M pq = 
Blinding phase:
The requester has a message m , and he/she whishes to have it signed by the signer. The requester randomly selects an integer k such that 0 k M < < as the blinding factor. The requester computes and submits the number 
Blind signature scheme based on Chebyshev polynomials
In this subsection, we propose blind signature scheme based on Chebyshev polynomials. We modify the above algorithm to use the first kind of Chebyshev polynomials ( ) n T x instead of monomials n x , as follows:
Blinding phase:
The requester has a message m , and he/she whishes to have it signed by the signer. The 
Unblinding phase:
After receiving * s from the signer , the requester computes
Verifying phase:
The s is a signature on the message m. The other users can verify the legitimacy of the signature by checking whether
Example for Proposed Blind signature scheme:
We now present an example with artificially small parameters by taking a bank example.
Initially Bank should do the following:
• Chooses two large primes p = 5 and q = 17 which are kept secret • Receives signature pair ( , ) s m from the customer.
• Sends signature pair ( , ) s m to bank.
• Bank accepts signature if (Customer signature) 223 (259)(mod 85) 4 S T = =
SECURITY ANALYSIS OF BLIND SIGNATURE SCHEME BASED ON CHEBYSHEV POLYNOMIALS
In this section, we examine the correctness, blindness, unforgeability and untraceability of the proposed scheme.
Correctness:
In the unblinding phase of our proposed scheme, the requester can derive the signature by computing the proposed blind signature, the security depends upon both the intractability of the integer factorization and discrete logarithms of Chebyshev polynomials. The proposed scheme utilizes fewer numbers of bits due to inherent property of Chebysev polynomials as compared to its blind signature scheme counterpart such as RSA blind signature scheme. The proposed blind signature scheme is suitably illustrated using a bank example.
